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In this paper I present a theory capable of analysing the welfare 
effects of a wide variety of institutional innovations which have in 
common that they involve the deregulation of, or the lowering of  tariffs 
and taxes on, a range of economic activities that can be effectively 
separated from the regulated,  taxed  and protected  industries of  which  
they are a part. The partial deregulation of economic activities in this 
manner will be shown  to lead  to the  expansion  of  trade,  but  also to 
involve  potential costs of  locational  diversion  of  trade and negative  
externalities.  In the context of the debate over deregulation the 
development of free economic zones can be seen as a practical 
compromise that generates powerful local interest groups pushing partial 
deregulation against the well-known in- terest groups opposing general 
deregulation. 
In this study I could draw on a limited stock of published research, 
none of which deals directly with the problems considered to be central in 
this study, but which provides some useful institutional information. 1 
In the first part I provide a descriptive analysis of free economic 
zones. Part II presents the political economy and Part III the welfare 
effects of free economic zones. In Part IV I speculate about the possibility 
of using the free zone concept for the partial deregulation of other heavily 
regulated industries. The paper closes with a summary and conclusions. 
 
 
Remark: Many people have helped me to refine the arguments and find empirical illustra- 
tions presented in this paper. I would like especially to thank Walter Block, John Chant, Max 
Carden, Steve Easton, Sid Fancy, John Helliwell and Lars Svensson. I also benefited from 
discussions during seminars at the Universities of Mannheim, Ziirich, St. Gallen and Penn- 
sylvania; at the German  Military  Academy  in  Hamburg,  UNIDO  in  Vienna,  the  Institut fiir 
Weltwirtschaft in Kiel, the HWWA-Institut  ftir Wirtschaftsforschung  in Hamburg  and the  
Institute  for  International Economic Studies in Stockholm. 
1 The economics literature dealing with the free trade zone phenomenon is limited to 
three theoretical papers, Hamada [1974], Rodriguez [1976] and Hamilton and Svensson 
[1980], and the more institutionally oriented papers by Wall (1976], Fernstrom [1976), 
Ping [1979] and Diamond [1979]. This literature has failed to create a comprehensive theory 
of free trade zones capable of assessing their welfare effects and suggesting tests for empirical 
study. 
 
I. Analytical Description of Free Economic Zones 
 
Free Trade Zones 
 
Free trade zones are areas separated from the surrounding host 
country's territory by fences or other barriers into which goods from 
abroad can be brought without quota restrictions or the payment of 
tariffs and excise taxes, and without being subjected to exchange con- 
trols, and to the majority of statistical reporting requirements and regu- 
lations aimed at the protection of consumers. Goods can be stored, used 
in manufacture, exhibited, assembled, sorted and sold in such zones in 
processes that are subject to the host country's normal laws governing 
environmental protection, workers' safety and employment conditions. 
Profits and wages earned in the zones are taxed at regular rates. Goods 
can be exported as freely as they are imported. However, when goods are 
brought into the zone's host country, they are subject to the normal im- 
port quotas, duties and excise taxes. 
In practice free trade zones may be as small as a retail store in an 
airport or as large as the territory of Hong Kong and they may serve the 
simple function of warehousing or may contain a broad spectrum of in- 
dustries. The essential feature of free trade zones for economic analysis 
is that they lower the host country's level of protection through the re- 
duction of tariffs, quantitative barriers and administrative hindrances to 
trade 1. 
For example, a firm imports goods into the free trade zone, processes 
or assembles and then exports them. The firm saves the duty on these 
imports and for these goods the host country's tariff revenues and there- 
 
 
 
1 When a free trade zone consists of only a warehouse, it is often called simply a "bonded 
warehouse". In the United States in recent years factories, such as the one assembling Volks- 
wagen automobiles in Pennsylvania, have been declared free trade zones. In some instances, 
as in Panama, the free trade zones consist of a large area containing industries of many types. 
There are also free trade zones devoted to retail stores only, as at many international airports 
and harbors. According to our definition, Hong Kong represents one very large free trade 
zone. The Hanseatic cities of Northern Europe and the Free Cities of Germany, similarly 
used to be large free trade zones. 
In developing countries we find also so-called "industrial estates" and "export processing 
zones". They have all of the characteristics of free trade zones as described in the text but 
in addition, they often provide subsidized services and facilities to occupants. One such 
service of great value often provided is an agent that deals with the host country's bureaucracy 
in the name of the zone's occupants [UNIDO, 1980]. 
 
 
fore average tariff rates are lowered 1•  Many countries have rules under 
which certain goods imported are assessed at a certain rate, but if these 
same goods are embodied in a product that has a certain domestic value- 
added percentage, then they enter at a lower tariff rate. Activities in free 
trade zones often contribute this required percentage of domestic value 
added and therefore indirectly lead to the lowering of tariff rates 2• When 
imports are subject to quota restrictions, then they can be stored in free 
trade zones and imported whenever quotas become available. As a result, 
the effective import restrictions implicit in a given quota are lowered. 
Importers value highly other effective duty reducing benefits provided 
by free trade zone operations. For example, defective goods can be de- 
stroyed in the zone before a shipment is imported into the host country 
and duty is assessed. Free trade zones serve as show-rooms for customers 3• 
In addition there are savings in costs of dealing with customs and tax 
authorities which for small firms often are relatively large. 
At the end of 1979 there existed 344 tax-free trade zones, free ports 
and similar designated areas on 72 countries of the world. In the United 
States there were about 50 such zones and plans existed for the creation 
of many more. It was estimated that in 1979 about $100 billion of total 
world trade of $ 1,300 billion went  through free trade  zones.  Forecasts are 
that by 1985 about $ 300 billion or 20 per cent of world trade would pass 
through such free trade zones [Diamond, 1979). 
 
Free Banking Zones 
 
Euro-Currency Banking. - It is now widely accepted that one of the 
primary causes of the rapid growth of Euro-, Asia- and Latin-American 
currency banking since the 1960s is the exemption which this type of 
 
 
1 The savings for the exporter and therefore the practical reduction in duty burden 
from operating in the free trade zone usually is only equal to the opportunity cost of the 
duty paid since in most countries a system of duty drawbacks returns customs paid on all 
exported intermediate inputs. However, it should be noted that the economic effect of 
these savings for exporters may be quite significant since they are relevant to the export 
activity's value-added base. Therefore it is important to evaluate all of the reductions in 
protection in terms of the concept of effective protection as developed by Corden [1971]. 
2 This characteristic of U.S. tax laws explains why several foreign automobile assembly 
plants in the United States have been made into free trade zones. 
3In Hamburg oriental carpet dealers regularly take customers to their large warehouses 
in the duty free zone. In New York a free trade zone on a dock serves as an exhibition ground 
for sellers of machinery, to where customers can bring samples of goods for a demonstration 
of the processing capabilities of the equipment. Diamond [1979] provides an extensive list of 
benefits for exporters and importers located in free trade zones in a form useful for agents 
promoting a free trade zone. The sources of reduced operating costs noted here are merely 
samples designed to make the general point. 
 
 
banking enjoys from the taxes implicit in minimum reserve requirements. 
That this is so can readily be seen by consideration of the following 
simplified example. 
Consider a bank located in Montreal which pays interest on deposits 
at the annual rate of 8 per cent and therefore pays $8 on a $100 deposit . 
.Faced by an assumed 15 per cent reserve requirement, this bank can lend 
out only $85 of the deposit and if the loan rate is 10 per cent, it earns 
$8.50. Under these conditions, the $100 intermediation business brings 
the bank net operating revenue of $8.50 -  $8 = $0.50. Assuming that 
operating costs for labor, etc. constitute $0.45, the before income tax net 
profit is $0.05 per $100 deposit. 
Now assume that this bank opens a branch in London, England, and 
persuades its customers to do business there in return for a marginally 
higher deposit and marginally lower loan rate. For the sake of simplicity 
we assume that this margin is so small that in the present calculation it 
can be disregarded. Under these assumptions and remembering that there 
are no legally required reserves on foreign currency deposits for banks 
located in London, the net operating margin of the Montreal bank branch 
on a $100 deposit is $10 - $8 = $2, which is four times that the parent 
bank could earn in Montreal. If labor and other costs are the same $0.45 
per $100  of intermediation in London as in Montreal, the London branch 
shows a before income tax net profit of $ 1.55. Shifting business from the 
taxed  and  regulated  home  base  to  the  free  banking  zone  in  London 
therefore  implies  an  increase  in  the  bank's  net  profit  margin  of  over 
3,000 per cent1. Analogous increases in net profit margins are available to 
banks in most countries on deposits and loans made in foreign currencies. 
The preceding example illustrates the strength of the incentives facing 
banks to enter the Euro- and other regional currency business and explains 
why this type of banking has grown from practically nothing in the 1960s 
to over $ 1,500 billion in 1980. For our purposes of analysis it is important 
to note that it involves a partial deregulation through the lowering of an 
implicit tax on a type of business that can be kept separate from the regular 
and regulated other business in two ways. First, the deregulation applies 
to business transacted in a geographically  defined area, just  like 
 
 
1 In fact, the spread  between  lending  and  borrowing  rates in Euro-currency  markets 
in individual currencies is narrower than  that found in the currencies’  home countries by an 
amount equal approximately to the implicit cost of the respective countries' reserve re- 
quirements. In effect, customers are reaping a large share of the benefits of the taxes saved. 
Portfolio balance considerations of banks, lenders and borrowers prevent perfect arbitrage 
between the rates in domestic and Euro-currency markets. However, the illustrative calcula- 
tions are indicative of the strength of the incentives facing banks to escape domestic regula- 
tion, which persist as long as lending and borrowing spreads are determined in the domestic 
markets. 
 
 
 
in the case of  free trade zones discussed above, but with the important 
difference that in practice all of the rest of the world is the free economic 
zone.1   Second,  the  deregulation  applies  to  a  certain  type  of  business, 
namely foreign currency deposits, even though it may take place within 
a geographic territory where the banks'  other business is fully regulated. 
 
Free Banking Zone in New York. - In the year 1981, after many years· 
of negotiation, a free banking zone was opened up in New York [Cheng, 
1981) and if it is successful, more such zones will be created in other U.S. 
centers of finance. The basic idea behind the establishment of these zones 
is the removal of reserve requirements on banks in order to induce the 
return to the United States of some of the business that has been lost to the 
rest of the world through Euro-currency banking. The problem faced in the 
establishment of these zones is how to prevent massive shifts of domestic 
business into them, which would produce serious inequities between 
ordinary banks and those operating in the zones. In addition, such shifts 
would raise the reserve-deposit multiplier and create problems for U.S. 
monetary policy. The solution to these problems adopted is that banks are 
freed from U.S. reserve requirements only on deposits in large 
denominations owned by others than U.S. residents. This particular method 
for the separation of deregulated from regulated business is likely to limit 
severely the growth of business in the 
U.S. free banking zones, though in the end their chances for success in- 
volve an empirical question which only actual operation of the zone can 
provide. 2 
 
Free Insurance Zone 
 
Lloyds of London. - During the great wave of regulatory fervor in 
the postwar years all industrial countries have imposed increasingly 
more severe restrictions on the operation of insurance companies. 
During this period Lloyds of London grew rapidly because it 
constituted a haven free from regulation. 
Lloyds has attracted mainly two types of business from other coun- 
tries. First, there are the special risks for which there are few or no ex- 
 
 
1 Germany is the exception since that country's banking laws require the maintenance 
of reserves on deposits in all currency denominations, As a result, Germany harbors practically 
no Euro-currency banking business. 
2 It should be interesting to discover how enforceable is the foreign residence requirement 
in preventing shifts of domestic business into the zone, given the well-known ease with 
which funds can be funnelled through foreign branches and subsidiaries. Also, given the low 
cost of information transmission it is likely that new institutions can be developed which 
permit effective circumvention of the legislation restricting U.S. residents from use of the 
zone. 
  
perience ratings, such as the cancellation of Olympic Games 
broadcast opportunities and the cancellation of computer leasing 
contracts. Second, there are the very large risks of insuring super-
tankers and large-scale industrial projects. Lloyds has not attracted 
from other countries the standard fire, accident and life insurance 
business for which the local availability of agents is of paramount 
importance. 
It is clear from the preceding description that an effective 
separation of regulated and deregulated insurance business has taken 
place in the world. Routine business involving large numbers of 
relatively small accounts has remained under the control of national 
regulatory authorities largely because transactions costs of dealing with 
Lloyds are too large. Special and very big risks, on the other hand, have 
been shifted to Lloyds either because in the case of special risks the 
advantages of deregulation are great or in the case of very large 
routine risks the transactions costs for the insured multinational 
enterprises are small. 
 
The New York Free Insurance Zone. - In 1980 New York opened 
a free insurance zone [Decaminada, 1979; The Economist, 1979]. Similar 
zones may well be established in other U.S. cities. In the New York 
zone resident insurance companies can underwrite risks that require a 
minimum annual premium of $100,000 without obtaining the permission 
of regulatory authorities of the State of New York. In addition they can 
under- write many special risks which  have been  identified by the 
authorities and whose common characteristic is that regulators  in  the  
past  have been unable to ascertain promptly  and reliably  that  premiums  
charged and other conditions of the contract protect the consumer  and 
assure viability of the underwriters. Because of the regulatory delays 
and costs such risks in the past have been insured by Lloyds. 
The intent of the New York free insurance zone is clearly to return 
some of the business that has been lost to the deregulated environment 
abroad by offering similar deregulation to New York firms. But through 
the specification of the nature of deregulated business, an effective 
separation between regulated and deregulated sectors is assured. Some 
doubts have been raised about the likely success of the New York 
insurance deregulation experiment [The Economist, 1979] on the 
grounds that the success of Lloyds has. been due not only to a favorable 
regulatory environment but also to the special expertise and financial 
structure of the firm.
1
 It remains to be seen how successful will be the 
New York free insurance zone in exploiting the benefits of deregulation 
and accumulating the required  expertise. 
 
1 Partners in Lloyds face unlimited personal liabilities
 
 
Free Gambling Zones 
 
The State of Nevada constitutes a free gambling zone. It was created 
in 1931 when the sparse population of the state and its distance from centers 
of population amounted to the effective separation of markets. Only well-
to-do people who could afford to travel to Nevada would be ex- posed to 
the risk of deregulation while the masses of ordinary citizens continued to 
be protected by the regulatory umbrella. 
The establishment of gambling casinos in Atlantic City was approved 
and undertaken in the same spirit as Nevada's, though the strength of the 
possible discrimination between regulated and deregulated customers is 
much weaker. Still, in contrast with totally free gambling in New Jersey, 
limited free gambling in Atlantic City significantly reduces the exposure 
of ordinary citizens to the temptation of the activity. Already existing 
proposals for the establishment of other gambling centers in the United 
States suggest that if Atlantic City is successful, they will be established 
not in large urban centers but in relatively small resort centers where access 
by ordinary citizens is limited. 
In Europe, where for a long time there has been less regulation of 
gambling than in the United States, big-time organized gambling through 
roulette and card games has been permitted only in casinos located in 
famous 19th century spas such as Baden-Baden and Monte Carlo frequent- 
ed by royalty and gentry and where access is rather difficult for ordinary 
citizens. British gambling clubs require membership fees that represent a 
barrier to use by local residents of moderate means. 
 
Free Enterprise Zones 
 
It is widely accepted that the decay of city cores in Britain and the 
United States is due to a very significant degree to regulation of business, 
which affected especially small business and the employment it provided 
traditionally [Butler, 1980]. In Britain legislation has been passed that 
led to the designation of some depressed urban areas as Free Enterprise 
Zones. In these zones a number of burdensome types of regulation and 
taxation have been eliminated. The U.S. Congress is debating legislation 
that would permit the establishment of such zones in depressed U.S. cities. 
The need to create effective separation between regulated and deregu- 
lated business has given rise to as yet unresolved problems in the formu- 
lation of the U.S. legislation and has led to problems with the British zones 
since discrimination in essence is based on geographic location. As a result, 
the borders of the zones create strong discontinuities. They have induced 
some business to move from outside the zone into it.  In  the process  they  
have  created  a  belt  of  depressed  activity  and real  estate 
 
 
values around the zones. In addition, the zones can develop into tax havens 
for large firms. It remains to be seen whether it will be possible to create 
legislative mechanisms that allow the effective discriminatory deregulation 
and tax reductions to be channeled properly for the achievement of the 
stated objective of stimulating the establishment of new small enterprises 
without generating  costly additional regulation. 
 
II. The Political Economy of the Free Economic Zones 
 
The preceding description of the types, characteristics and growth of 
free economic zones raises the question why they have been permitted to 
develop in the past when there was generally strong faith in the need for 
and ability of regulation to improve free market institutions. Further- 
more, the question arises why they are growing so rapidly in number in 
recent years when, after widespread realization of the high cost of regu- 
lation, efforts to achieve general deregulation have been stalled? In this 
section I will provide provisional answers to these questions arguing first 
that free economic zones are an instrument for selective deregulation and 
second, that they generate powerful interest groups which assure political 
success. 
 
Selectively Targeted Deregulation 
 
Regulation is basically a blunt instrument. For example, foreign trade 
restrictions bring costs to all regions of a country while of ten benefiting 
only a few. This proposition holds in the case of tariffs on automobile 
components, which benefit an industry that is often concentrated region- 
ally, but the tariffs raise the cost of automobiles and automobile assem- 
bly, harming the interests of other regions, including some which under 
free trade might have a comparative advantage in automobile assembly. 
Similarly, regulation often provides paternalistic protection for con- 
sumers whether they need it or not. For example, in the insurance under- 
writing business for large tankers, it is reasonable to assume that the buyer 
does not need the state's protection concerning rates charged and the 
fiscal soundness of the insurer, while there is a much stronger case for 
protecting the public from the sellers of life-insurance policies that use 
unethical selling techniques and invest customers' funds fraudulently or 
unwisely. Also, the case for protecting the uneducated and poor from the 
temptations of gambling is certainly greater than that for protecting the 
wealthy. 1 
 
 
1 None of the above examples are to be interpreted as making an absolute case for 
regulation. I think that the argument about the need to protect the poor but not the rich 
from the temptations of gambling is paternalism of the worst sort since it is combined with 
elitism.
 
 
 
The preceding examples suffice to make the case that regulation is 
basically a blunt instrument that cannot readily be applied to meet the special 
requirements of regions and groups of people. Seen in the light of this 
characteristic of regulation it is clear that free economic zones represent an 
instrument for the selective application of deregulation, permitting in 
principle the development of an optimum pattern  by regions and classes of 
customers. 
However, free economic zones are a useful instrument for selective 
deregulation only if two conditions are met. First, there must be a need 
for it and second, it must be technically feasible to achieve a separation of 
the regulated and deregulated market. In the case of the examples cited 
above, these two criteria appear to be met, except in the case of free enter- 
prise zones where it is not clear that it is technically feasible to limit 
deregulation to the economically relevant firms. 
 
Interest Group Backing 
 
It is well known that the deregulation of some U.S. industries has been 
stalled because the deregulation lowers the welfare of some firms and 
workers clearly and by a substantial amount so that it is worthwhile for 
them to form well-financed interest groups lobbying with politicians and 
presenting them with a credible threat of the loss of blocks of votes in 
case their industries are deregulated. The beneficiaries of the deregulation, 
on the other hand, usually are large in number and would gain very little 
each from deregulation. As a result, they have no incentives to form interest 
groups and lobby with politicians for deregulation. Consequently, even in 
cases where it is widely accepted that the sum of small benefits exceeds 
the large costs to a few, the political process of deregulation is often stalled. 
The preceding model of the political economy of regulation, however, 
can be used to explain why in the case of industries where complete 
deregulation is stalled, partial deregulation through the creation of free 
economic zones has been accomplished successfully. The reason is simply 
that the free economic zones generate benefits sufficiently large and con- 
centrated for some firms, workers and local governments that it is prof- 
itable for them to form interest groups for lobbying with politicians in favor 
of the zones. The costs created by the zones, on the other hand, tend to 
be small and diffuse and therefore do not generate strong interest groups 
and political opposition. 
The preceding considerations can be illustrated by reference to a free 
trade zone. When the Volkswagen company considered establishing an 
assembly plant in Pennsylvania, local workers, small businesses and govern- 
 
ments stood to benefit a great deal and they formed a powerful lobby that 
succeeded in obtaining legislation  which  granted  free trade zone status 
to the VW assembly plant. The producers of automobile parts in Michigan 
whose level of protection was lowered through the free trade zone suffered 
only marginally and in ways which were difficult to establish quanti- 
tatively. If they tried to lobby against the Pennsylvania zone, they 
obviously did not succeed because they were unable to generate a credible 
voting threat. 
In the case of the free banking and insurance zones the pattern of 
interest group pressures was even more in favor of their establishment 
because most of the firms in the zones are branches of existing U.S. firms, 
which expect no reduction in business done in the regulated sector in the 
United States and instead expect to gain at the expense of foreign firms 
and by bringing home business that had been lost to partial deregulation 
abroad. As foreigners have no votes in U.S. elections, opposition from 
these interests was ineffective and the main battle was in persuading 
domestic firms unable to open branches in the zone that the planned 
techniques of discrimination would be successful in preventing loss of 
business from the regulated sector 1. 
 
III. Welfare Effects of Free Economic Zones 
 
The creation of free economic zones raises welfare through the more 
selective application of regulation according to the requirements of 
different regions and groups of customers. In real terms, the deregulation 
lowers costs of protection and of transactions, permitting welfare gains 
through the expansion of trade and specialization. Free economic zones 
are likely to have dynamic effects on the supply of work, technology and 
entrepreneurship. 
However, free economic zones also may reduce welfare through the 
locational diversion of trade and investment and through the generation of 
negative externalities. In addition, there are welfare effects of an in- 
determinate sign due to the redistribution of tax revenue between govern- 
mental jurisdictions. 
Theoretically, the overall, net welfare effects of free economic zones 
are indeterminate.  Only empirical studies  can  lead  to  estimates  of  net 
benefits and it is doubtf ul that some of the effects can ever be measured 2• 
 
1 The New York free banking zone was long delayed by opposition from U.S. banks 
which were prevented by federal law from opening branches in the zone and which feared 
that the zone would divert business away from them. 
1 Perhaps it will be possible to employ the methodology used in tbe empirical study of 
the effects of trade diversion and creation in connection with economic integration. In these 
studies externalities and tax effects have also been ignored or tre::lPd as residuals. Hodjera 
(1978], Johnson (1976] and Grubel (1980] have attempted cost benefit studies of regional free 
Euro-banking  centers. 
Weltwirtschaftliches  Archiv  Bd. CXVllI.
  
 
Real Economic Effects 
 
As was shown above, the creation of a free trade zone amounts to the 
lowering of the level of protection of the host country. It is well known 
from the theory of international trade that such a lowering of protection 
leads to increased levels of trade and specialization, which in tum results 
in higher community welfare. This proposition is illustrated with the help 
of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model  in the figure, where the small home-
country's import good X and export good Y  are measured  along the 
horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. In initial equilibrium production 
is at point  P0 on the production possibility locus XY, where the protection-
distorted domestic relative price line TT' is tangent and the relative price 
of the traded good is equal to the marginal rate of transformation in 
production. Trade takes place along the world price line WW' and permits 
attainment of welfare level C0 , where the domestic price level is equal to 
the marginal rate of substitution for consumers. 
 
Trade Creation and Locational Trade Diversion 
Export good Y 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 x Import good X 
 
The lowering of protection due to the creation of the free trade zone is 
assumed to result in the new domestic price ratio T1T1’ with the new 
equilibrium output at P1 and consumption at C1 after trade at the 
unchanged world price WW'. The core of standard international trade 
theory consists of establishing rigorously that consumption point C1 
must imply a higher level of welfare than C0• It follows therefore that if  
 
  
  
 
the creation of a free trade zone leads only to the lowering of protection and 
has no other effects, a small country must gain welfare through the 
increased specialization in production which exploits its comparative 
advantage. However, the lowering of protection through the creation of  a 
free trade zone does have another effect which requires amendment of the 
standard model and results. 
 
Locational Trade Diversion 
 
The elimination of protection in the free trade zone may induce pro- 
duction to take place in an inefficient location, resulting in extra costs of 
production that lower the level of welfare below that which the country 
could attain if the same reduction in protection had been available uni- 
formly to all firms regardless of location. Two examples may serve to 
illustrate this important point.  First, when bank intermediation business is 
induced to shift from Montreal to London through the absence of the 
reserve requirement tax, several extra real costs of doing business are in- 
curred because the London branch of the Montreal bank has to be staffed 
and supervised over great distances from the parent's headquarters. 
Lenders and borrowers incur extra costs of communication or travel or 
perhaps just legal complications by dealing in London rather than in 
Montreal, where by assumption in the absence of free banking in London 
they would have done their business at least cost. These added social costs 
of Euro-currency banking must be offset against the social gains which 
accrue because the smaller spread between lending and borrowing rates in 
London induces some extra lending and borrowing and makes capital 
markets more perfect. It should also be noted that the private incentives for 
doing business in London rather than Montreal remain in spite of  these 
extra social costs, for otherwise the shift  of the business would not take 
place. 
As a second example consider the Swiss village of Nandans, which is 
located in a high valley between Switzerland and Austria. Because of 
difficult access from Switzerland in the 19th century this village was granted 
exemption from Swiss excise taxes and tariffs. In essence, it is a free trade 
zone which attracts much business through offering low prices especially 
in heavily taxed and protected gasoline and cosmetics. The economic waste 
created by this free trade zone is readily apparent as one envisages heavy 
gasoline trucks slowly lumbering up the steep mountain road to the village. 
These trucks are followed by long lines of private passenger cars. Once in 
the village the gasoline is transferred into the tanks of the passenger cars 
via the pumps of tax-exempt gas stations. After this transfer the cars and 
trucks return to the lowlands for regular, productive work. It is clear, that  
 
 
 
the free trade zone induced business in Nandans is privately profitable, but 
that it involves a relatively substantial waste of real resources. 
In terms of the model in the figure, the inefficiencies caused by the 
locational diversion of business are shown by production taking place at 
point P3, which is inside the efficient frontier. While trade still takes place 
at the world price line WW', the point of consumption C3 must necessarily 
be below C1 because the only difference between the two situations is 
that C1 is reached without the inefficiency cost of the locational diversion 
of business. Whether or not C3 is on a higher indifference curve than C0 is 
an empirical question that depends on the relative magnitude of the gains 
from trade creation and the losses due to the locational diversion of trade. 
However, it cannot be ruled out on logical grounds that because of loca- 
tional diversions of trade free trade zones result in a net loss of welfare 
by the criteria of the standard trade model 1• 
 
Defensive Deregulation 
 
At this point of the analysis it is important to introduce a distinction 
between what might be called offensive and defensive free economic zone 
creation. When a free trade zone is created in a country we have the 
offensive case for which all of the preceding conclusions about trade creation 
and diversion are relevant. However, the creation of the free banking and 
insurance zones in New York involve a defensive act in the sense that they 
are a response to prior deregulation abroad in the form of Euro-currency 
banking and Lloyds of London, as described above. There- fore, these U.S. 
free zones reverse some of the locational diversion of trading that the prior 
deregulation had produced and they are more likely to be raising welfare 
than are the offensive zones. 
Generally, the preceding analysis suggests that the costs of trade diver- 
sion are likely to be the smaller the more free economic zones there are. 
In the limit, the number of zones will be so large as to include all of the 
country's territory and in effect universal free trade is achieved with zero 
costs of trade diversion. 
 
 
1 The results of the analysis focusing on the concepts of trade creation and locational trade 
diversion are strongly reminiscent of results obtained in the analysis of the effects of economic 
integration [Lipsey, 1960]. In fact, we have here simply another case of the second-best and 
reconfirmation of the basic principle that partial movement towards free competition does not 
necessarily result in greater welfare. However, the results of second-best policies are ultimately 
an empirical matter and in this context it may be useful to note that most studies of the 
effects of European integration concluded that trade expansion dominated by far trade diversion 
effects. However, only actual studies of free trade zones from this point of view can establish 
whether the beneficial effects of integration also prevail in the case of free trade zones. No 
such studies have been brought to my attention. 
 
 
 
 
 In this context it is worth noting that the "underground economy", which 
recently has become the object of much study [Feige, 1979; Mirus and 
Smith, 1981) is a form of free economic zone, which involves welfare gains 
and losses that are analogous to those of free economic zones j11st 
discussed. Deregulation that causes economic agents to leave the under- 
ground economy are defensive and can lead to a lowering of existing costs 
of locational diversion costs. Free gambling zones may well have this result 
if they induce gamblers and the suppliers of  gambling services to give up 
their illegal activities, creating social savings in the form of less crime 
and corruption. 
 
Capital Flows 
 
Free economic zones generally, but free trade zones in developing 
countries especially, can give rise to capital flows which have potentially 
important welfare implications. As is well known, regulation and protec- 
tion in many developing countries represent serious barriers to the inflow 
of capital, even if local labor productivity would otherwise make such in- 
vestment profitable. The establishment of a free trade zone which removes 
these barriers can induce the inflow of capital which raises the producti- 
vity of local labor, may generate dynamic linkage effects and gives rise to 
income tax revenue from the profits of foreign firms, all of which trans- 
lates into gains in welfare for the  host country. At the same time, the 
owners of capital in the rest of the world gain since t heir private yields 
are increased. 
The growth in world welfare caused by the more efficient global allo- 
cation of capital is in addition to that of the gains due to the more efficient 
allocation of given resources in each country discussed in the preceding 
section. However, as in the case of the effects involving given resources, 
the flow of capital can result in costs of locational diversion. For example, 
foreign capital which has located in the Philippines' Bataan free trade zone 
might have located elsewhere in Philippines if deregulation had been uni- 
form for the whole country. If this is the case, the productivity of the 
capital is lower than it would have been if it had located in the most efficient 
place. In the extreme, if the foreign capital comes from a regu- lated 
environment, the true social productivity in that zone may be lower than 
what it was in its country of origin. Again, as in the case of the anal- ysis of 
the effects with given resources, the net welfare effects of capital flows 
induced by free economic zones on the host and home country are a function 
of the empirically determined relative effects of creation and diversion. 
 Dynamic Effects 
 
All of the preceding arguments about the welfare effects of free  econom- 
ic zones are essentially static in the sense that they considered the re- 
sults of induced changes within the analytical framework of given resource 
endowments, technology and the efforts of workers and entrepreneurs. 
This approach misses what in the longer run may be the most important 
source of benefits of free economic zones, the dynamic effects. While they 
are notoriously difficult to predict or even to identify, their importance 
was stressed in empirical studies of the effects of integration and they 
underlie the widespread interest in supply side economics in the 1980s. 
The dynamism generated by selective deregulation has already manifested 
itself in the more rapid and frequent innovations in banking and insurance 
services offered, in Euro-currency banking and by Lloyds of London, re- 
spectively. It has been due to the fact that only commercial and technical 
feasibility determined their introduction and regulatory processes could 
not prevent or even delay them. The well-known past innovations in the 
free banking and insurance zones are likely to be followed by more and 
free zones in other industries should result in similar acceleration of inno- 
vation. 
 
 
Externa l Diseconomies 
 
There exist two competing theories of the reasons for regulation. The 
first suggests that it is the outcome of democratic political processes which 
enable special interest groups to enrich themselves at the expense of the 
general public and overall total welfare [Wolf, 1979; Cairns, 1980]. To the 
extent that free economic zones lower trade barriers under  this model they 
injure only special interest groups and increase overall welfare. Therefore, 
the estimates of welfare gains due to free trade zones must be revised 
upward in a way that can never be rigorous. 
Under the second model, protection is imposed to eliminate some 
market failure. Lowering of trade barriers through free economic zones 
thus leads to the reappearance of external diseconomies and a social cost 
that has to be included in the welfare analysis presented above. 
The impact of the external diseconomies can logically consist of the 
following extremes. First, the external diseconomies are confined to the 
host country, as for example might happen if through lowered protection 
of an import-competing  industry  the country loses the security benefits 
of domestic agriculture or of a defense industry. Under these conditions 
the welfare calculus for the host country has to be adjusted downward. 
The calculus for the rest of the world requires no adjustment. Second, the 
external diseconomies accrue mainly to the world as a whole  and only
 minimally to the host country. For example, Euro-currency banking is 
feared to have raised the probability of a major global financial crisis 
because in the absence of national regulatory controls these banks have 
invested imprudently large amounts relative to their capital base to in- 
dividual borrowers of doubtful ability to repay [Grubel, 1979]. Whatever 
may be the merit of this argument in practice, it serves to illustrate how 
deregulation of banking in Euro-currency markets can result in negative 
externalities for the world while most of the benefits from the deregu- 
lation accrue to the few financial centers hosting the Euro-currency banks. 
In such cases the welfare calculus of the effect of free economic zones must 
be amended in obvious ways that are not pursued here. 
Finally, it should be noted that if the methods used for discriminating 
between regulated and unregulated sectors are working imperfectly, busi- 
ness which should be regulated escapes into the deregulated sector. For 
example, it may not be possible to exclude people from free gambling zones 
who through excessive losses become public burdens, or firms with 
imperfect knowledge may be induced to do business with deregulated banks 
and insurance companies that is not in their long-run interest and leads to 
social losses. The negative external effects of such imperfect separation of 
regulated and unregulated markets must  be  entered  into the social welfare 
calculus of free economic zones. 
 
Tax Revenue Effects 
 
Free economic zones cause a redistribution of tax revenue between 
governmental jurisdictions that permit some to lower taxes and require 
another to raise them (or change expenditures without corresponding 
changes in taxation). The resultant welfare effects are well known from 
the public finance literature and will not be pursued here. Instead, the 
following is limited to a brief taxonomy of the major tax revenue effects. 
The local government jurisdiction hosting the free economic zone 
gains income directly if it is the landlord of the zone and raises charges 
to land users upon establishment of the economic zone.1    
 
 
 
 
    1   If the owner of the land wishes to maximize his income, he will charge for the use of 
the land an amount that is analytically equivalent to the economic rent which accrues to the 
occupant. A duty-free camera retail store at an airport, for example, faces a downward 
sloping demand curve and sets the price at an output level and accompanying price where 
marginal revenue equals marginal costs, with all inputs available at constant prices from the 
regulated sector and the rent being determined as a residual. In this extreme case, all of the 
benefits from deregulation accrue to the airport authority and the local government owning it. 
Capital, managers and labor of  the store are paid  only  their opportunity cost in the 
regulated sector. 
If landlords charge rent above the monopolistic optimum, the level of business done 
in the tax free store will also be less than optimum. I have noted that in some countries duty 
free airport stores charge prices that appear to be above the optimum and therefore appear to 
transact very little business. The question arises whether in these cases the stores exploit a 
very inelastic demand curve, the determinants of which may not be obvious to the casual 
visitor or whether landlords have set rents too high in ignorance of the elasticity of demand. 
On the other hand, it is also possible for landlords to charge less than the optimum amonnt. 
In this case the entrepreneur leasing the store enjoys economic rents, which may imply non-
desirable income distribution effects. To avoid non-optimal outcomes, the owners of land on 
which free economic zones are established should set charges through competitive bidding. 
 
  
If the local government has an income tax, revenue is raised by the 
growth in factor incomes accompanying the free economic zone trade 
expansion and as the tax base is broadened through the migration of capital 
into the zone from the host country and abroad. Overall increased activity 
and wealth raise excise and property tax revenues of the local jurisdiction. 
The senior government of the country hosting the zone suffers a loss 
of tariff and other revenue generated by regulation equal to that avoided 
by firms locating in the free economic zone. In addition, there is a shrink- 
ing in the income tax base as factor incomes are lowered in industries 
which contract because of lower protection. Offsetting these losses are 
higher factor incomes and therefore income tax revenue from export in- 
dustries and the broader tax base created by the flow of foreign capital 
into the zone. The rest of the world loses tax base through the outflow of 
capital. 
The most important conclusion emerging from this brief overview is 
that the local government hosting the zone always gains tax revenue and 
it should therefore not be surprising that local governments typically are 
prime promoters of free economic zones. Senior governments, on the other 
hand, are likely to lose revenue unless the trade expansion and foreign 
capital inflows are large enough to offset the losses. This may well be one 
important reason why some senior governments, such as that of Canada, 
oppose the creation of free trade and economic zones. 
 
IV. Free Economic Zones for Other Industries? 
 
Free Investment Zones 
 
After the analysis of the nature and welfare effects of free economic 
zones, it may be useful to consider application of the principles developed 
to other industries which are well known to suffer from heavy regulation. 
I will do so here for the investment and drug-medical industries. 
Paternalism in the regulation of capital markets of the world is very 
strong, having moved from an initial concern with the accuracy of infor- 
mation disclosed about investment projects to where some governments 
have taken it upon themselves to evaluate the economic merit and risk of 
projects. Inevitably, the legislative requirement to have all capital issues 
approved by the bureaucracy has resulted in additional costs and delays 
and in effect requires government officials to do things for which they are 
not particularly well qualified. Doubts have been expressed that these 
costs are worth the benefits to investors [Kalymon, 1978]. 
As in the case of insurance and banking, there is room for disagreement 
over the net social benefits of regulating capital markets and there exist 
powerful interest groups benefiting from the regulation. Complete de- 
regulation is therefore unlikely and it may be worth considering partial 
deregulation through the establishment of free investment zones. In such 
zones borrowers would not be required to obtain government approval of 
prospectuses accompanying the issue of new securities. Investors' pro- 
tection would consist of the remaining applicability of laws which make it 
a criminal offense to misrepresent facts in prospectuses. Basically, how- 
ever, investors would be required to have their decisions guided by the 
 principle of "caveat emptor", which would induce them to study prospec- 
tuses carefully, use the services of private firms specializing in such eva- 
luations, or both. And, of course, they always have the option of not 
buying securities in the zone at all. 
It may well be that in equilibrium there would be dual capital markets. 
Risk averse and untrained investors would purchase securities in regulated 
markets and would be willing to pay the premium and accept delays in- 
volved. Firms in relatively stable industries, such as utilities, might find 
the costs and delays in getting approval acceptable and would be the main 
suppliers of securities in these regulated markets. In the unregulated zones, 
on the other hand, securities would be sold to investors with a preference 
for risky but potentially high return securities and with special skills in 
evaluating investments. Small and newly created firms in industries where 
new investment opportunities tend to develop  quickly, such as high-
technology and resource development, would supply securities and gain 
greatly in their ability to exploit new opportunities quickly and cheaply. 
 
Free Medical Zones 
 
It is well known that the regulation of drugs, hospitals and medical 
doctors has resulted in excess costs because the political and bureaucratic 
incentive structure puts too much weight on the prevention of problems 
with new products and treatments relative to the cost incurred by delays 
or cancellations in the introduction of new products and treatments 1. 
There exist in fact free drug and hospital zones in Mexico, some Eastern 
European countries and in the Swiss Canton of Appenzell2. Patients from 
many countries take advantage of these facilities, of ten after treatments in 
their home-countries were unsatisfactory. Because public health-insurance 
programs in most countries do not cover treatment in such zones abroad, 
access has been limited to wealthy persons. 
The creation  of  free medical  zones in industrial  countries would  be 
defensive in the sense defined  above and could be  achieved  simply by 
setting aside areas within which most of the existing regulation of drugs, 
treatments and doctors are inapplicable. Patients who consider use of the 
facilities in the zones would have to rely on their own judgement and that 
of  their  doctors  and  relatives  as to the merit of the risks and potential 
benefits offered. They would have also as protection the desire of firms in 
the zone to continue in business, which would prevent them from offering 
drugs and treatments that are ineffective  or carry excessive  risk  in  use 
Perhaps it would be useful to require that all consultations between firms 
in the zone and patients  be  recorded  on  video  tape  as  evidence  that  
 
 
 
1See Grabowski [1976] and Wardell [1979] for studies which indicate that the U.S. cost of 
obtaining permission to market a new drug was $ 50 million on average in the middle 1970s 
and involved testing over several years. As a result, life-saving drugs that had been proven 
effective and safe in Europe have become available in North America only after several years 
and after much unnecessary suffering and deaths. Some so-called "orphan drugs" are never 
marketed because expected sales levels would not permit the recovery of the required $ 50 
million investment  in obtaining government approval, even though, by all medical standards 
such drugs are effective and safe. 
2 Appenzell is the home of many clinics using "natural" treatment methods for many 
ailments. Medical doctors can practice and use their titles obtained abroad without having 
to pass examination required in other Swiss cantons. According to casual observations by 
 Swiss economists, the Canton of Appenzell has attracted many patients from abroad for a 
long time and business has not been impeded by expensive law-suits or scandals. 
patients had been given full explanations of risks, benefits and costs and 
had consented to treatment  under  free  will  and  in  possession  of  their 
facilities. 
It is clear from the preceding considerations that free investment and 
medical zones do not offer an opportunity for the separation of markets in 
the same way as do the free banking and insurance zones. In these latter 
types of zones use is restricted easily to customers who through their size 
and other characteristics clearly have very little need for the paternalism 
of the state. In the case of free investment and medical zones it is not 
possible to use objective criteria to limit access to those who obviously do 
not need protection. In the case of the medical zone, in fact, arguments 
can be made that potential users are in special need of state paternalism. 
For these reasons perhaps the suggested creation of free investment and 
medical zones has little chance of being implemented in the near future. 
 
 
However, in principle, the case for free investment and medical zones 
is much like that for free gambling zones and there may well come a time 
when like in the case of gambling the costs of regulation become so great 
that relatively small and politically independent areas will encourage the 
creation of such free investment and medical zones because of the large 
local benefits they promise. 
 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper I have described several recent and diverse institutional 
innovations which have in common that they permit the selective de- 
regulation of economic activity by location or type of customer or both. 
It was shown that such selective deregulation, referred to conveniently as 
the creation of free economic zones, generates powerful interest groups 
which can succeed politically where attempts at complete deregulation are 
stalled because of some doubts about the merit of the action and because 
vested interests oppose it politically. 
The welfare effects of the free economic zones are theoretically indeter- 
minate. There are gains from the expansion of trade, encouragement of 
innovation and increased freedom of choice for producers and consumers. 
Welfare losses may arise from the locational diversion of trade and ex- 
ternalities, including some due to the imperfect separation of regulated and 
deregulated sectors. Some free economic zones created in New York are 
defensive in the sense that they are in response to zones created ab- road 
and the accompanying diversion of trade. Such zones are likely to reduce 
rather than increase the cost of locational diversion of trade. 
If the already existing free economic zones are successful commercially 
and costs in terms of locational diversion and externalities are small, 
further free economic zones are certain to be created and new industries 
included. The selective deregulation of the investment and medical indus- 
tries may be primary candidates for such new initiatives. 
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